Stewart’s Reports from Eutaw Springs

The Battle of Eutaw Springs, fought on 8 September 1781, was a key piece of the southern Revolutionary War. The final large battle in the deep south, it marked the end of the conventional war south of Virginia. Yorktown remained in the future, as did the prolongation of the civil war between Whigs and Tories that inflamed Georgia and the Carolinas. But, after Eutaw Springs, what a later generation would call “major combat operations” were at an end below Virginia.

Eutaw Springs was remarkable on many levels. It is known foremost for the curious results that appeared in the two commanders’ reports: both claimed victory. Not just any victory, but crushing, decisive, overwhelming victory. Call me crazy, but one of them was wrong.

As matters developed, it was Nathanael Greene. Greene had fought a winning campaign since taking over the southern army in December 1780. However, he had not won a single battle, and he could see the clock was running down. He badly needed a win, a big one, and he seized on Eutaw Springs as his chance. He almost won the battle, but as his troops moved forward to clinch the win, they encountered the tents of the British camp. Fatally distracted, the troops dived into the tents to find riches beyond belief: shoes, clothes, food, and liquor. The offensive, once rich with promise, foundered. The British right flanking forces, let by the savior of the day, Major John Majoribanks, seized important terrain as well as four artillery pieces, and drove the disorganized Americans first from the British camp, then from the field.

Greene evacuated the battlefield and moved back to his line of departure, the next site rearward that had water. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart, the British commander, held the field, and under the rules of the day, won the battle. Stewart, however, lived in an environment of declining British power. The British had been in retreat for months, due more to the activity of partisan commanders like Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter than the conventional war of Nathanael Greene. Stewart, tactically victorious, was not in a position to hold the ground in the face of a hostile Whig populace, so the next day, he continued the inexorable march toward Charleston. Greene, seeing his chance, reoccupied the ground and declared victory, just, as a technical matter, one day too late.

For all the shenanigans on Greene’s part, Stewart also had questions to answer, and he proved willing to depart from the strictest line of complete accuracy for the benefit of telling a great story to headquarters. His problems started early in the morning of 8 September, when two deserters from the American force appeared in Stewart’s camp with intelligence on Greene’s troop strength, artillery, and precise route of march. Stewart, unimpressed, placed the men in confinement and neither believed nor investigated their information. This proved a disastrous decision.

Greene had benefited from success in the south and augmented recruiting. His army totaled 2,500 men, but the key fact was that it included 1,500 Continentals, a force of regulars equal to the massive formation that met Cornwallis’s main British army at Guilford Courthouse. All these men were moving forward toward Stewart, exactly on the route stated by the two deserters. Stewart, oblivious, sent out two groups of soldiers in Greene’s direction. One was a screening formation of 190 men under Major John Coffin. Coffin spied the American vanguard, and ignorant of the deserters’ information, believed he had found a reconnaissance party. Sensing victory, he charged, finding only disaster in the overwhelming American numbers.

The second group has gained fame in the legends of the battle, because this was the “rooting party” that figured so prominently in the lore of the battle. At the time, the British sent out parties of soldiers in the morning to dig sweet potatoes, hence the name. Despite the intelligence from the deserters, 8 September proved no different, so a large body of unarmed men went forward, unaware of any danger, to gather food for the day. As it turned out, they chose the same road Greene selected for his advance. The result, predetermined by the arithmetic, was another complete disaster for the British.

Stewart, bloodied twice, got his men into order of battle. The numbers have proven elusive, not an unusual development during a time when commanders on both sides gladly exaggerated strength and casualty figures. Stewart told Cornwallis he beat an army of 5,000 Americans with only 1,200 British regulars. The secondary sources, and there are many, have advanced numbers for Stewart in a vast range. There is no point in dissecting these, because the actual reports from the British army are available to eliminate any speculation.

The British reports may be accessed here.

The first number was in the morning report for 8 September. It showed a huge British army, 3,080 men of all ranks, including artillery and cavalry. After subtracting the sick list, men on details, and men captured, there remained 1,875 effectives, a massive force that rivaled Cornwallis’s juggernaut at Guilford Courthouse. The morning report is entitled, “Return of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart, taken on the Morning before the Action at Eutaws, September 8th 1781.” It is archived in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Records of the British Colonial Office, CO Class 5, vol. 104, pages 265–266.

The British prepared a second report later the same day, and reflects the soldiers actually on the field. These numbers were much smaller, 1,394 soldiers of all ranks. This second report is entitled, “Return of the Number of Commissioned Non Commissioned Officers, Rank & File in the Action at Eutaws September 8th, 1781.” It is archived in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Records of the British Colonial Office, CO Class 5, vol. 104, page 267.

We are still a long way from Stewart’s boast to Cornwallis. Lest we accuse Stewart of lying to his commander, some analysis is in order. The starting point is the morning report with, in rounded numbers, 1,900 men. From this total, Stewart dispatched a baggage guard, left in the rear to guard wagons and supplies. He also subtracted “batmen,” enlisted personnel detailed to service as officers’ valets. The two categories, once more in rounded numbers, accounted for 200 men off the field.

With 1,700 men counted, we reach the rooting party. While there were many estimates ranging in the literature, the official report provided the best accounting: 300 men, a huge force, far beyond the estimates from American sources. Of these, 150 were captured, the rest scattered for the duration of the battle. The official report is entitled, “Return of Officers Non Commissioned Officers, Rank & File sent out on a Rooting Party from the Army under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Stewart on the Morning of the 8th Sept. 1781, before the Action at Eutaws,” archived in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Records of the British Colonial Office, CO Class 5, vol. 104, page 262.

Subtracting the rooting party, we have 1,400 British soldiers on the field, still a far cry from Stewart’s number. The 1,400 men is an all ranks figure. At the time, it was not unusual to report troop strength using only rank and file. Ian Saberton has recommended a 17.5% figure to account for officers, noncommissioned officers, and musicians in eighteenth-century units. Subtracting 17.5% of 1,400 men gets us to Stewart’s figure.

While Stewart was within an acceptable range in his troop count, he was less than candid in other aspects of his reporting. He reported to Cornwallis that the men in the rooting party carried their weapons, a much better look than the truth, that 300 men went forward, unarmed, a point made clear by Henry Lee on the American side, by Charles Stedman on the British. He reported to Cornwallis that he lost one artillery piece in the fighting. At the time, cannons served as markers for success on the battlefield. Sensitive to this fact, he failed to mention that he lost three and regained two. There was also the obvious example of his count of 5,000 Americans opposing him. There were more, but for all the spin in the reporting, his count of British soldiers, albeit misleading, was given in a form common in its day.