The Clove and Pigree Maps of Cowpens

The Battle of Cowpens was blessed with very few contemporary maps. The most famous, the Hammond map, was drawn late in life by Samuel Hammond, a militia commander, long years after the battle. There are only two other candidates for authenticity, and they present the potential for problems other than the passage of time. The two maps are commonly referred to at the “Clove” and “Pigree” maps. The two share some commonalities, including some intriguing questions.

The maps are maintained in the National Archives, in Record Group 93 of the War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records, Entry 6 of the Numbered Records. The Clove map is manuscript number 23813, the Pigree map is manuscript number 28475.

The first page of manuscript 23813 is a letter from Major Jean-Bernard-Bourg Gauthier de Murnan, labeled by one historian “the most violently erratic officer to serve in the Continental Army.” Murnan was a military engineer, a creature in short supply in the American forces, so Murnan, as with several others, came from France to assist the war effort of the French ally. Murnan left behind a colorful history of tantrums and altercations. Ultimately court-martialed for misconduct and dismissed from the service, he was reinstated, certainly out of necessity, by George Washington.

In early 1781, Murnan, as an engineer, was involved in the construction of a fortification in the Ramapo Pass near the New York-New Jersey border. The pass in the Ramapo Mountains, known by many names, including Sidman’s Pass, Smith’s Clove, or just the Clove, had been a focus of the northern war for several years. Murnan’s fortification, known as the Clove Blockhouse, was one in a series of works in the Clove.

On 15 February 1781, Murnan, his work on the project stalled from a lack of manpower, wrote a letter to his commander, Colonel Pigrin, requesting more “artificers,” the eighteenth-century term for combat engineers. The next page of the manuscript is a map of the Cowpens battlefield. There is no question the map was part of the letter. The manuscript pages were folded together, with the map on the outside. The page containing the map also contains the indexing language, indicating the document inside the folds was a letter from Murnan about the Clove Blockhouse. Here is the Clove map as it appears in the manuscript:

The aspect of the Clove map that immediately grabs the viewer is its accuracy. The British line is a mere sketch, with the units in outline form only, and two artillery pieces in the forefront. The American forces, however, are remarkable. As readers of my book on the subject, The Battle of Cowpens, Reexamined, know, one of the deficiencies in Cowpens scholarship is a paradoxical insistence that Morgan drew his men into three lines of battle. He did not, and the Clove map correctly reflected Morgan’s actual disposition of men in two lines.

As Morgan made clear in his after-action report, he formed the Continentals into a main line with militia as flank guards. In front, he posted four regiments of militia riflemen. Washington’s cavalry stood in reserve. The Clove map accurately reflects Morgan’s disposition. In fact, it does so perhaps too well. As Morgan described the formation, the front line, moving left to right, consisted of regiments commanded by Hays and McCall, then Cunningham, then McDowell, then Brandon and Thomas. What he wrote was a little confusing. Regiments usually had a colonel and a lieutenant colonel, so the reference to “Hays and McCall” was to a single regiment, naming both officers. The author of the Clove map apparently fell for the confusion and depicted six rifle regiments on the front line. In fact, during the battle, McCall was detailed to the cavalry and was with the reserve, not commanding a rifle regiment on the first line.

The Pigree map seems to be of the same vintage. Manuscript 28475 also contains two pages. One is a cover sheet, noting the contents contain a reference to General Morgan’s action of 17 January 1781. The indexing information states the document pertains to “Colonel Pigree,” presumably the same officer as Colonel Pigrin, and states his office as quartermaster general. This is the Pigree map as it appears in the manuscript:

The Pigree map, in more detail than the Clove map, was more confusing. The map’s author showed both the initial dispositions as well as troop movements during the battle. To start, this author made the same mistake as the previous one, placing six rifle regiments on the front line. He then showed the two regiments commanded by Cunningham and McDowell moving forward. This appears to have been a second misunderstanding on the part of the author. Morgan wrote that McDowell and Cunningham were posted “in Front of the Line 150 yards.” Morgan meant all the rifle regiments, centered on McDowell and Cunningham, were deployed 150 yards in front of the main line. He did not mean that two regiments moved forward another 150 yards, all alone and out of line with the others.

On the main line, he correctly showed the Continentals under Lieutenant Colonel Howard, with militia units on flank duty, included, as depicted, those commanded by officers named Triplette, Tate, and Buchanan. Behind the main line, he showed Washington’s cavalry in reserve. He then showed the militia units on the flanks of the main line after they had withdrawn behind the Continentals, placing them in the proximity of the cavalry’s starting point.

The two maps, although similar, do not completely agree. The most notable inconsistency was the deployment of the British artillery. The Clove map placed the two British guns near the flanks, the Pigree map close to the center. It is revealing that the positioning of the British artillery was one item Morgan mentioned little, noting only “in Front moved two Peices of Artillery.”

Both maps give every appearance of efforts to illustrate Morgan’s report of the battle. There was nothing in either to prove they were the recollections of independent eyewitnesses. The confusion over four versus six regiments on the front line, and the positioning of the British artillery, speak volumes about reliance on Morgan’s report of the battle.

On another level, it makes sense to suggest the maps are derivative and not original. They appear in correspondence between Major Murnan and Colonel Pigrin in New York. Murnan’s only documented venture south was to Yorktown. On 15 February 1781, he was in New York. It is possible he attended the Battle of Cowpens the previous month, but it seems far more likely he drew his map, or both maps, while looking at Morgan’s report.

A complete version of both manuscripts may be accessed here.