The legends of Cowpens are dense and pervasive. While writing The Battle of Cowpens, Reexamined, I found many legends growing out of the battle, to the point that it became clear that much of what we knew about Cowpens was legend, not fact. A good example is the question of what weapons the Americans carried into battle.

The standard military weapon of the day was also the standard hunting weapon, a flintlock musket. Accurate to 40 yards, commanders used them in massed volleys beginning at 150 yards, taking advantage of a volume of fire rather than aimed shots. The Continental soldiers carried muskets, as did their professional British counterparts.

The American militiaman showed up for duty with the weapon he owned. In most cases, it was a musket. In some, a rifle, and this presented advantages and disabilities. The rifle was much more accurate at distances. A man-sized target presented no problem for an experienced rifleman 300 yards away, a feat unthinkable with a musket. Its downside was reloading time. A good rifleman might get off one shot a minute, often one in two minutes. These times contrasted dramatically with reloading times of several rounds a minute for the musket.

What, then, did Morgan’s men carry at Cowpens? Unfortunately, this question has become buried in legends accreting to the battle. As with many of the misunderstandings about the battle, this can be attributed to Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee. Lee, a vivid and dramatic writer, penned a popular memoir of the southern war. His versions of events, right or wrong, drew great audiences who believed what they read. Lee was not at Cowpens, and his writing tells us he was only generally aware of what happened there. He knew Morgan had innovated new battle tactics involving the rifle. In this, Lee was correct. Morgan had massed riflemen on his first line with orders to take down the British command structure. The innovation worked extremely well, and the riflemen took a deep toll of British officers and noncommissioned officers.

Lee learned of the battle imperfectly. Although aware something was done with the riflemen, his understanding was incomplete. When he put pen to paper to write his book, he insisted, incorrectly, that all Morgan’s men carried rifles. This would have been essentially impossible. Morgan wanted three rounds from the militia. Given the rifle’s reloading time, Morgan could get no more than two, perhaps only one, firing from a rifleman. Moreover, the contemporary records remarked on a few, selected units carrying rifles. This made sense; the rifle was the exception. A musket was expected. Most of the units on the field attracted no comment on their armament, meaning they carried, as expected, the standard flintlock musket. Even so, the idea that all Morgan’s men carried rifles gained great traction, maintaining prominence to the present day.

General Joseph Graham penned a series of letters and memoirs after the Revolutionary War. Graham was a militia general in the War of 1812, a captain in 1780. In a letter to William Davie in 1808, he lamented that when the militia mustered, “put the question to yourself what kind of troops do you get?” Like the majority of the officers of his day, he saw many advantages in the musket, fewer in the its backcountry cousin, the rifle. The answer to his question was not a tribute: “I think you will find the arms half rifles.” His rough accounting was entitled to great credibility. He fought for years with the militiamen from the backcountry and knew well what they carried. The musket was the most popular weapon in the country overall. The rifle was found in Pennsylvania and along the southern frontier. The Battle of Cowpens, fought with large numbers of southern backcountry militia, found large numbers of riflemen on the field. But it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest all the Americans carried rifles. The musket was simply too popular, and as Graham lamented, seen as too valuable, to overlook.

It is long past time to rid the battle of many of its legends. While many made fascinating stories, some, like the idea all the Americans carried rifles, need to be discarded once and for all. Morgan was a brilliant commander and innovator. While he added new depth to the use of the rifle, arming his entire army with them was not one of his innovations.

Morgan’s tactics spoke to the weapons carried by his men. Morgan deployed one line of riflemen on his front line. They had orders to deplete the British command structure by targeting officers and sergeants. The riflemen then had orders to retire behind the main line of infantry. The main line fielded the Continental soldiers in line, all armed with muskets. The flanks were guarded by militia under Andrew Pickens, with men deployed in masses to take employ the volume of fire enabled by the musket. The riflemen on the front line were dispersed, to take advantage of the cover and concealment the men found. The musket troops formed completely differently, packed together into tight, neat lines, to take advantage of the mass volleys enabled by the musket. The rifle, accurate at long range, took out selected targets. The musket, useful to put masses of lead in the air, did the heavy lifting at much closer range.

For all the reports and memoirs of the officers, a private soldier filing an application for pension benefits fifty years after the war explained Morgan’s plan of battle perfectly. John Thomas was a rifleman on the front line at Cowpens. In his application, number 16271, he noted the events: “The riflemen were under the command of Genl. Morgan were 200 yards in front, the orders were that not a gun should be fired without orders. The riflemen were to fire one round break in the centre and fall off to the right and flank of the musket line.” They complied. After the riflemen fired, “The British then charged bayonet on the musketry. The musketry then had orders to fire but doesn't know how many rounds they fired before they retreated, they retreated then about 80 yards and were then ordered to wheel and fire, they did so, the British being within about 30 steps of them. The hot firing continued about an hour and forty minutes and then the British broke and run.”

The tactics at Cowpens were brilliant and innovative. More to the point, they reflected the mix of weapons in the hands of the soldiers. Riflemen on the front line took advantage of the rifle’s accuracy. Musket-wielding troops on the main line capitalized on the musket’s massed volume of fire to finish the work.